COIN Today
In this section the articles are concerned with current counter-insurgency campaigns and issues. Of course, some of these small wars have been going on for some time and with different insurgent groups at the fore, such as in the case of the Philippines or Afghanistan. Yet, they are all classified as 'COIN Today' or current counter-insurgency fights because they continue to cause blood-shed and destruction in their respective locales regardless of which group now makes manifest their predilection for violent politics.
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COIN Sequitur?
Terry Tucker, Ph.D.
The purpose of this paper is to provide trends on tactical context in Counterinsurgency Operations for advisors and trainers in the realm of security, development and reconstruction.
Terrorism and tribal dynamics
From the DAWN Newspaper 4th Nov, 2011 | Opinion | By Khalid Aziz
THE 'war on terror' and the long-drawn-out violence that shows no signs of giving respite has taught Pakistanis a number of important lessons. One of these is that violence seems to grow in proportion to the amount of violence used.
Over-Burdened Soldiers - Lessons From The Bush Wars Of Souththern Africa
By Pierre van der Walt
I found the topic and the articles sourced via David's link quite interesting. Naturally I do not have the answers. In my time we were not particularly overburdened as common soldiers, but in special forces overburdening was hectic due to the stuff operators had to carry in. In normal infantry role a distinction was made between patrols and attacks and we were burdened accordingly.
Language, Culture, and Doctrinal Convergence of Trends in Full Spectrum Operation's
Terry Tucker, Ph.D.
The purpose of this paper is to provide research information on doctrinal convergence and divergence, and elaborate upon the role of language and culture in counterinsurgency operations.
Time for careful planning
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper 28th Oct 2011
SINCE May 1, when US Special Forces carried out the raid resulting in the death of Osama bin Laden, the nation has been up in arms against what is perceives as a violation of its sovereignty by the US as well as the Pakistan military's failure to prevent the raid.
Anti-insurgency report card
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper 21 Oct 2011
THOSE who work in development have an accepted practice for evaluating the performance of a project: after polling stakeholder perceptions, a 'report card' is issued classifying success or failure against measurable indicators.
Crisis in ties with Afghanistan
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper Oct, 2011
RECENTLY, President Hamid Karzai signed a strategic partnership agreement with India in New Delhi. Among other things, it provides for the training of Afghan army officers in India.
Implementing the resolution
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper Oct, 2011
AN initial salvo relating to Pakistan's alleged links with the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network was fired on Sept 12 by US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta who threatened that the US would attack the Haqqani network if Pakistan failed to act.
Endgame in Afghanistan
By Khalid Aziz | From the 30th Sept 2011 Dawn Newspaper
THE current tensions in Pakistan-US ties have convinced many Pakistanis that the US will undertake an operation in North Waziristan thus breaching Pakistani sovereignty.
The emerging crisis
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper 23 Sept 2011
ON Sept 13, the Taliban attacked the US embassy, the Nato headquarters and other buildings in the green zone in Kabul, while suicide bombers struck police buildings in the city.
The real cost of 9/11
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper 16 Sept 2011
THE 10th anniversary of 9/11 was a sombre occasion for reflection on the meaningless suffering and violence caused by Al Qaeda and its franchises as well as the subsequent military reaction by states across the globe.
A Decade of Terror
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper 9 Sept 2011
This Sept 11 we will complete a decade of living with the consequences of the 9/11 attack on the US. That cataclysmic event has changed the world permanently.
Reality Begins to Dawn
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper 26 Aug, 2011
After 10 years of facing an existentialist threat from terrorism inflicted by extremist groups, Pakistan has finally woken up to the seriousness of the situation.
Dynamics of Fata Reforms
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper 19 Aug 2011
The government of Prime Minister Gilani is inconsistent, yet sometimes it surprises everyone with a landmark moment.
Though it is marked by questionable decisions and bad governance most of the time, periodically it pulls out political rabbits out of its hat.
What Pakistan Can Learn
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper 12 Aug 2011
THE recent report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan is a critical appraisal of the efforts made during the past 10 years in that unfortunate country.
It warns, "There is no possibility that any amount of international assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will stabilise the country in the next three years unless there are significant changes in international strategies, priorities and programmes."
Bin Laden's Last Laugh
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper 5 Aug 2011
SIMONE de Beauvoir, the French existentialist writer, was on the dot when she remarked, "If you live long enough, you'll see that every victory turns into a defeat."
With that in mind, one must inquire now what happened to the euphoria of the US 'victory' when the Taliban surrendered Kandahar on Dec 7, 2001. In 2004 and then again in 2007, Osama bin Laden said that he would bleed the US into bankruptcy, as he had done earlier with the Soviet Union. Today, it is quite clear that the military situation in Afghanistan is chaotic and appears to be failing.
Semantics of Terrorism
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper 29 July 2011
When we discuss issues that have to do with terrorism we often tend to avoid using the correct
word or description. Therefore, the first casualty is truth.
In order to remain in the safe world of non-controversial matters, we avoid discussing the real
drivers of terrorism. Instead, we identify hunger, poverty and unemployment as the causes of
terrorism. An analysis under this framework does not pay dividends; one must identify the real
motivating force that drives terrorism if we are to create the right policies.
Role of Communication in Radicalization of Swat
by Khalid Aziz
The holding of a game changing National Seminar on De-radicalization by the Pakistan Army in Swat in early July is an important development aimed at shifting the existing strategy of confronting violence in Swat through the use of military force to finding long term solutions for rooting out the causes of extremism and radical thought.
Time for Unity
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper 20 May 2011
AFTER the 9/11 attack, the US began to put together its response to global terrorism based on its wealth and power.
The US is a strategic gorilla in a world of middling and poor states. It accounts for a huge 23 per cent of the world's GDP and is also the biggest spender on the means of war - a whopping 43 per cent of the global military expenditure.
Osama bin Laden
By Khalid Aziz | From the Dawn Newspaper 6 May 2011
OSAMA bin Laden's epochal journey to awaken the Muslim world came to an end in the town of Abbottabad and practically next door to the military academy that trains officers to defend the state created in the name of Islam in 1947.
Late Colonel Imam , A man of action
By Brigadier Yasub Dogar
Brigadier Yasub Dogar was one of the outstanding professionals of Pakistan Army. Thus keeping on line with Pakistan Armys
system of promoting mediocres he did not become a general.
Attacks on NATO Oil Tankers
by Agha H. Amin
Attacks on NATO oil tankers following NATO air attack on Pakistani para military border post in Parachinar are a major strategic turning point in Af pak region.
FC in Counter Insurgency Role in Balochistan
by Agha H. Amin
It was a surprise and a shock to hear that now Balochistan operation would be conducted by the Frontier Corps.
When I retired from the army in 1993 it was said that in Balochistan the people either feared the FC (Frontier Corps) or Allah! Jokes aside this meant that the FC being a force governed by law of jungle fired without restraint, killed without remorse and operated above all laws. It was common that the FC killed civilians and buried them unreported, as many other government functionaries do in Balochistan!
Balochistan and the NWFP
Major A.H. Amin
Major A.H. Amin (Pakistan Army, Retired) occasionally writes for us. Today he sent two notes. The first note says that 80% of the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan freely operates across the Pakistan-Balochistan border of 1500-kms, where no Pakistani troops are stationed to stop them. The Pakistan Army has deployed heavily in the NWFP, but there's only 20% of the Taliban operating from NWFP.
Why Waziristan Cannot be Conquered
by Agha H. Amin
Those who know the Pathans and their history will know exactly what is happening in Waziristan today and which Lashkar is doing what and for what reason. The tribal Pathans have traditionally been supreme fighters who defied the Mughal occupiers, the Sikh occupiers, the British occupiers and now the latest occupiers, i.e. the US coalition chasing the Pathans and Muslims of various castes and creeds motivated by sheer ideology.
How America Corrupted Afghanistan:
Time to Look in the Mirror
Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
The U.S. cannot ignore Afghan corruption and hope for any kind of victory or meaningful end state in the Afghan conflict. The fact remains, however, that corruption is only one of the problems that the U.S. and its allies must address in an active war zone, and anti-corruption drives are largely a triumph of hope over experience in societies with a history of systematic corruption. They almost inevitably do little more than prosecute a few token scapegoats and turn the leaders of any serious anti-corruption program into martyrs. This is especially true of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, where the host government needs the corrupt and loyal powerbrokers and where the U.S. needs the support of a corrupt host government.
Grand Strategic Contradictions in US Military in Afghanistan
Ret. Major Agha H. Amin
Pakistans Role in US NATO Afghan War and CLAIMS OF PAKISTANI STATE ABOUT WAR ON TERROR AND ITS BILL AND LOSSES
Ret. Major Agha H. Amin
Pakistans role the Afghan War being waged post 9/11 has been ambiguous all along.
While Pakistans military establishment which has controlled Pakistans Afghan and India foreign policy since 1977 saw Afghanistanas its backyard and a training ground for Pakistani non state proxies,Pakistans military junta was forced to be a US ally at gunpoint in the post 9/11 period.
Operation Moshtarak: Lessons Learned
The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS)
NATO?s Operation Moshtarak, launched in February 2010 in Helmand province, was the first deployment after the beginning of the much-debated surge of 30,000 additional US troops. It was billed as the largest military operation since the invasion of 2001. The planning for the operation emphasised the needs of the Afghan people, and the importance of winning hearts and minds as part of a classic counter-insurgency operation. However, the reality on the ground did not match the rhetoric. Welcome improvements in the size and conduct of military operations were undermined by a lack of sufficient corresponding measures in the political and humanitarian campaigns.
By, With and Through: The Intelligence Driven Endeavor
The Critical Importance of Intelligence and Advisorship in Countering Insurgencies and Terrorism (March 2009)
By Robert Gully
Abstract. This paper is an examination of the essential need to combine intelligence and advisorship for Host Nation forces countering insurgency and terrorism. Successful Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terror (COIN/CT) cannot be realized in the long term without effective Intel practices and effective advisorship. This analysis is a view point providing two specific areas of emphasis for Global War on Terror (GWOT) operations and how to focus on these necessities for military success in the fight against insurgency and terror.
PANJWAYEE - The Taliban's Pathway to Power
By Robert Gully
Conflict in the Middle East dominates the news and television. America’s Global War on Terror (GWOT) affects current events and politics worldwide dramatically. This two front war is controversial at best. It is the largest and longest war for American troops since Vietnam. The comparisons to the debacle Vietnam abound and some are not without merit as we find shifting strategies, political dispute and stumbling blocks in the US perception coupled with rampant corruption in the Afghan Government.
Fighting in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Soviet Intervention, 1979-89
Geoff Shaw and David Spencer
It is important to understand that, unlike the US in Vietnam, the Soviets engaged in a very limited war. Soviet deployments never exceeded 104,00 men at any given time. Over the ten-year period a total of 620,000 Soviets served in Afghanistan from the Armed Forces, KGB and MVD.
Losing the War One Doctrinal Mistake at a Time by Andy Wehrle
Wars are not always won and lost on the battlefield. Military doctrine is written to help shape the battle before the first round is fired. Doctrine is written to capture the lessons learned at the expense of the servicemen and servicewomen lost in the last fight.
Commander International Security Assistance Force Counterinsurgency Guidance
Our operational imperative is to protect the population while extending the legitimacy and effectiveness of GIRoA and decreasing the effectiveness of insurgent elements.
Global Insurgents and their Weapons
By William Stroock
Insurgent groups around the world - al-Qaeda in Iraqi, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Shabab in Somalia, Hamas and Hezbollah in the Palestinian territories - have waged a global jihad using a variety of deadly and unconventional weapons. These are the suicide bomber, the Improvised Explosive Devise (IED), the Explosive Formed Penetrator (EFP), the Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG), and the mortar, to name a few.
A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe's Colombia (2002-2006) vs FARC
Thomas A. Marks Ph.D.
Little is heard of U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency (COIN) in Colombia. That which does appear is often inaccurate and ideologically skewed. Yet progress in America's "number three war" has been significant and appears all the more impressive given the increasing difficulties experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Israel's War on Terror
By William Stroock
Since the beginning of the Second Intifada in September of 2000, Israel has waged its own war on terror. This war has seen a trio of large scale military actions (Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and Operation Cast Lead in 2009) and a dizzying array of special operations involving the Mossad, Shin Beit, and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). Israel’s enemies are the various Palestinian groups dedicated to the destruction of the Jewish state; the Palestinian Authority (run by Makmud Abbas’ Fatah Party), Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, and several other organizations including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Islamic Jihad.
Explaining Local Forces: Everyone Except Nepal has Them
By Dr. Thomas A. Marks
Local forces are an absolute requirement in restoration of legitimate government writ. This is true, as explained decades ago by T.E. Lawrence (he "of Arabia"), from the insurgent standpoint, in Chapter XXXIII of Seven Pillars of Wisdom. It all boiled down to numbers, time and space.
Put in simplest terms: The insurgents can choose the time and place to strike. The state
can never field adequate numbers of full-time personnel to provide adequate security for
the population. This can only be done by involving the population in their own defense.
Explaining Prachanda: Nepalese People's War Follows Classic Formula
By Dr. Thomas A. Marks
Nearly simultaneous release of the latest thoughts from Osama bin Laden and the Maoist leadership in Nepal is revealing in the way coincidences often are.
Bin Laden put out but a single statement, while the CPN(M) leadership of Prachanda and Bhattarai engaged in a veritable psywar blitz, granting interviews to all comers and publishing position pieces for good measure. What the statements of the Islamofascist bin Laden share with the Maoist duo is logic internally consistent but persuasive only if one accepts their flawed external analyses of the world.
How to Win in Afghanistan
Sebastian L. v. Gorka
It is hard to recall when a war document as topical as General McChrystal's confidential report on the chances of stabilizing Afghanistan was last leaked - and so soon after being published.
Yes, we had the infamous Pentagon Papers[i] during the Vietnam War, and after 9/11, the Rumsfeld memo[ii] asking how we can measure success in the Global War on Terror, but this new lengthy official assessment by the NATO and US commander was leaked within just weeks of it being sent to the White House and at the time when the future of our involvement in Central Asia is the hottest issue in the news outside of "Obama Care."
Afghanistan's Ghosts: 2006
("Whatever else Happens - we have the Maxim gun and they do not!")
My concern about this analysis, as with all the other experts that I have been looking at in COIN and counter-terror, is based on the fact that the modern analyst's mind, no matter how brilliant, consistently fails to sink deep enough to engage modern Jihadist terror at its core. What do I mean by this? Simply this: 99.999% of the Western analyst's work from a basis wherein their minds are attuned to supposedly rational and secular philosophies, actions, reactions and goals. This will never permit them to come to grips with the Medieval mind of the Jihadist. We think in terms of pressure and coercion that will eventually bring about the semi-rational response we want from them and then we will have victory. Let me speak plainly now: we will never have victory until we change ourselves. You simply cannot defeat that which is based on the hereinafter with prescriptions that would only have effect on those worried about the here and now. Hence the failure or weakness of the modern when he comes up against the Medieval!
Counter Insurgency and the Human Terrain
Col. Mike Williams USMC (Ret)
The oldest, but most oft forgotten maxim of counterinsurgency is the necessity of separating the population from the insurgents, inning the "hearts and minds." A cursory survey of the United States' counterinsurgency efforts since the Spanish/American War will reveal a lingering neglect of this fundamental principle. Why this is true is open to speculation and argument and would be an interesting topic for further discourse. There is, however, an initiative that, if properly pursued has the potential to change this c paradigm. This is the Human Terrain System.
Bear or Phoenix, Russia Rising
William Stroock
The Russian military is undergoing a transformation that will fundamentally alter its organization and the way it fights. In the coming decades, the blunt instrument that destroyed the Whermacht was poised to steamroll Western Europe, and utterly annihilated Chechnya will be no more. Under the directorship of Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, the Russian army is becoming smaller, more mobile, and professionalized. It is also modernizing. The end goal of this transformation is to create a well armed, well trained, professional army capable of battling both Muslim insurgents, like those the Russians fought in Chechnya, and conventional forces, like China's People's Liberation Army.
No Sign until the Burst of Fire
Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier
Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason
By 1932, British troops had been waging war of varying intensity with a group of intractable tribes along and beyond the northwestern frontier of India for nearly a century. That year, in summarizing a typical skirmish, one British veteran noted laconically, "Probably no sign till the burst of fire, and then the swift rush with knives, the stripping of the dead, and the unhurried mutilation of the infidels."¹ It was a savage, cruel, and peculiar kind of mountain warfare, frequently driven by religious zealotry on the tribal side, and it was singularly unforgiving of tactical error, momentary inattention, or cultural ignorance.
Understanding Human Dynamics
By the Defense Science Board Task Force
Among defense professionals, the "war on terrorism" and American interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have returned to prominence issue of "human dynamics," "culture," and "the human terrain." The United States faces actual and potential challenges from adversaries who differ from us in significant ways in the human and social dimension.
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